



Real World, Real Businesses, Real Values

Fear the Zombies – Part II

We wrote about zombie companies a year ago—companies that survived the Covid 19 lock-down, but that are not profitable enough to service debt and invest for the future at the same time. The inflation story has played out pretty much as expected, which continues to depress their margins. Now they face rising interest rates, which makes funding their businesses increasingly expensive. In many cases, these companies are no longer able to cover their interest expense, much less turn a profit. After a decade of an extraordinarily accommodative Fed and cheap money, they now face an existential threat.

According to a recent Bloomberg report, **zombie companies make up about 1/5th of the country's largest 3,000 publicly traded companies**, saddled with \$900 billion in debt. They were shock absorbers to inflation, and now face higher borrowing costs and more difficult credit conditions. They also make up a significant part of passive indices. For instance, we estimate zombies account for about a third of the Russell 2500 Value.

In addition to crosscurrents from Inflation, a war in Ukraine, rising interest rates (falling bond prices) and contracting equity multiples, investors now face the increasing risk of zombies. As an equity investor, the question of whether they survive (many will not) is less relevant than the question of equity value impairment. Citing the same Bloomberg report from above, 620 companies in the Russell 3000 index failed to generate enough operating profits over the last 12 months to cover their interest expense. We believe that list grows over the next year as the Fed raises interest rates.

We are already seeing this problem escalate in the debt markets. For example, cruise line operator Carnival recently sold \$1 billion of 8-year debt at a 10.5% yield. Their debt has swelled to \$36 billion vs pre-pandemic levels of \$11.5 billion. The good news is revenue is expected to jump 660% this year. The bad news is analysts still expect them to lose \$2.5 billion. If analysts are correct and they grow another 52% in 2023, they are expected to finally turn a profit – a profit of \$1.6bn – for a company with an Enterprise Value (market cap plus net debt) of \$45 billion. In their best year ever, they only earned \$3.1 billion. Since the book value of that debt does not change, guess who gets left holding the bag? The equity holders of course. If we get a recession, “Katy bar the door.”

Medical professionals take the Hippocratic Oath, “First, do no harm”. That is how we feel about investing – first, own no zombies. (Second is own no airlines.) Although there are certain periods of a business cycle that owning an inexpensive, passive index fund makes sense, we strongly believe this is not one of those periods, especially in in SMid and Small Cap. We believe there are simply too many global risks and crosscurrents to blindly throw money at stocks at the moment. We focus on owning businesses that can fund themselves (and their growth), with strong management teams able to operate and, more importantly, quickly adapt to the rapidly changing landscape.

Below is the linked to the Bloomberg article we referenced:

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-31/america-s-zombie-firms-face-slow-death-as-easy-credit-era-ends?srnd=premium&sref=vfD06998>

For more information, please visit: www.ballastam.com

Important Notes and Disclosures

Information presented herein is intended solely for educational purposes. Opinions expressed are subject to change at any time, are not guaranteed and should not be considered investment or tax advice. It is strongly suggested that the reader seek their own independent advice in relation to any investment, financial, legal, tax, accounting or regulatory issues discussed herein. The information contained herein is current as of the date indicated on the cover of this document and is believed to be reliable and/or has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but no representation or warranty is made, expressed or implied, with respect to the fairness, correctness, accuracy, reasonableness or completeness of the information and opinions.

This presentation contains “forward-looking statements” which can be identified by the use of forward-looking terminology such as “may”, “will”, “should”, “expect”, “anticipate”, “target”, “project”, “estimate”, “intend”, “continue” or “believe” or the negatives thereof or other variations thereon or comparable terminology. Because such forward-looking statements involve risks and uncertainties, actual results of Ballast Asset Management (“Ballast”) may differ materially from any expectations, projections, market outlooks, estimates or predictions (collectively, “Predictions”) made or implicated in such forward-looking statements, and all Predictions contained herein are subject to certain assumptions. Other events which were unforeseen or otherwise not taken into account may occur; these events may significantly affect the returns or performance of any investment strategy. Any Predictions should not be construed to be indicative of the actual events which will occur. Prospective investors are therefore cautioned not to place undue reliance on such forward-looking statements. In addition, prospective investors should bear in mind that past results are not necessarily indicative of future results, and there can be no assurance that Ballast will achieve results comparable to those of any prior or existing fund or product managed by Ballast or its management team.